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ortgage fraud consists of dishonest conduct, engaged in 
by a borrower or another person prior to the funding of 
a loan, that impairs the value of the loan. 
This crime has exploded during the past decade, and reports 
to the federal government of suspected fraud have risen by a 
magnitude of more than 20 times from 2000 to 2010.
Between 2000 and 2007, mortgage fraud was a key 
contributor to the unprecedented growth of toxic mortgage assets, 
which led to the implosion of the subprime lending market. 
One might think the collapse of the U.S. housing bubble, 
with falling housing prices and the tightening of mortgage loan 
underwriting standards since 2007, would result in a significant 
reduction in the amount of fraud; but this has not happened. 
In fact, the distress in the U.S. housing sales market has proven 
to be fertile ground for mortgage fraud, with reported incidents 
of fraud continuing to rise notwithstanding the overall decline in 
the number of sales of residences and new mortgage loans. 
New market conditions have led some perpetrators of fraud 
to develop new schemes and to modify older ones, and reported 
mortgage fraud increased 7 percent from 2008 to 2009. 
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The Epidemic of Residential  
Mortgage Fraud
Mortgage fraud is presently the 
number one white-collar crime in the 
United States, with the losses for 2009 
estimated to be in the range of $15 to 
$25 billion.
Mortgage Fraud Schemes
The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
defines mortgage fraud as “the 
intentional misstatement, misrepresentation, or omission by 
an applicant or other interested parties, relied on by a lender or 
underwriter to provide funding for, to purchase, or to insure a 
mortgage loan.”
Mortgage fraud resembles predatory lending in that both refer 
to tainted residential mortgage loans, but with predatory lending 
the wrongdoer and victim are switched. Predatory lending refers 
to improper behavior by the lender or by persons acting for the 
lender that results in a loan with terms that victimize the borrower 













Nevertheless, the two phenomena tend to occur in the same 
geographical communities, which are experiencing a lack of 
neighborhood stability due to factors such as high rates of market 
sales, high foreclosure rates and high vacancy rates.
Mortgage fraud consists of two main types – “fraud for 
property” and “fraud for profit.” 
Fraud for property occurs when a loan applicant intentionally 
overstates his income or misrepresents other relevant facts for the 
purpose of purchasing a property to occupy as a residence. Usually 
this scheme involves the purchase of a single property, with the 
borrower taking possession at closing and intending to make 
regular monthly payments thereafter.
Often, fraud for property goes undetected for a long time 
period. If the borrower never defaults, the lender does not incur an 
actual loss, and it is highly probable that the borrower’s fraud will 
never surface.
Fraud for profit refers to a more complicated scheme in which 
the fraudster’s purpose is to 
cause a lender to make a loan 
and then escape with the 
money. The idea is “take the 
money and run.” 
Often fraud for profit 
involves multiple transactions 
and the use of one or 
more “industry insider” 
intermediaries, such as a 
corrupt mortgage broker, real 
estate appraiser or settlement 
agent. Identity theft is 
frequently one ingredient in 
this type of wrongdoing. 
Fraud for profit accounts  
for a high percentage of mortgage fraud losses. Data collected by 
the FBI reveals that “80 percent of all reported fraud losses involve 
collaboration or collusion by industry insiders.”
Flipping is a common fraud-for-profit technique. It occurs 
when a property is sold multiple times between fake sellers and 
buyers at inflated prices to create the illusion of a market value 
drastically higher than the property’s real value. 
For example, a house worth $180,000 may be sold several 
times during a two-year period “on paper,” with the last sale 
displaying a price of $400,000. Immediately after the last sale, 
which is financed by an unsuspecting lender, the seller absconds 
with the loan proceeds. Foreclosure results, causing a large loss – 
more than the usual loss stemming from a distressed sale – because 
even with normal marketing, the property is worth far less than 
the value asserted in the appraisal submitted to the lender. 
Geographical Distance
Today, the typical relationship between a mortgage borrower 
and lender is characterized by geographical distance. This market 
characteristic began to develop during the 1970s and replaced 
“geographical proximity,” meaning the parties were situated in the 
community where the home was located.
During the Great Depression of the 1930s, the federal 
government adopted reforms that radically transformed monetary 
policy, the banking system and the operation of credit markets. 
The federal reforms had two major consequences for mortgage 
markets. First, the Federal Housing Administration, and later 
the Veterans Administration, insured long-term loans (20 to 30 
years) with much smaller requirements for down payments than 
previously required by private lenders. Interest rates were fixed for 
the loan duration, with monthly payments fully amortizing the 
loan principal. 
A second consequence was the development of national, 
standardized terms and documentation, which originating lenders 
had to use to qualify for the FHA and VA programs. 
Under the FHA and VA programs, the mortgage lenders who 
participated chiefly made loans in the local markets where they 
had a “bricks and mortar” presence.
Geographical proximity between lenders and borrowers was 
epitomized by the lending operations of 
the Bailey Building & Loan Association 
in the classic Jimmy Stewart movie, “It’s 
a Wonderful Life,” released in 1947. 
This locally owned institution took 
deposits from residents of Bedford 
Falls, which it recycled as capital by 
making home loans to other Bedford 
Falls residents. Saving, lending and 
borrowing were all geographically 
localized transactions.
Locally based home lending, 
engendering close proximity between 
borrowers and residential mortgage 
lenders, began to wane during the late 
1970s. 
Early the next decade, the federal government deregulated 
savings and loan associations, the backbone of home lending, 
allowing them to compete with financial institutions who offered 
newer financial products to customers. 
At the same point in time, the secondary mortgage market 
emerged, which allowed widespread sales of home mortgages 
through pooling and securitization. Gradually lenders sold more 
and more of the home mortgages they originated through the 
secondary mortgage market channels, so that by the 1990s it was 
rare for lenders to eschew that market by keeping mortgages in 
their own portfolios. 
Local mortgage loan origination followed by immediate sales 
in the secondary mortgage market creates geographical distance 
between borrowers and lenders. Although the local originating 
institution may retain the role of servicing the loan, the real owner 
or owners of the loan (usually institutional investors) are located 
in other communities, states and nations.
Another market change created further distance between the 
lender and borrower. Today, an increasing number of borrowers 
obtain their mortgage from out-of-town originators. From 
the standpoint of many borrowers, doing business with a local 
lender is not a priority. The main point is to obtain the required 
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A borrower may deal with a mortgage broker, who has 
access to multiple foreign lenders; or a borrower may shop for 
a mortgage loan directly, typically obtaining information and 
submitting applications through the Internet.
The geographical distance created between lenders and 
borrowers has substantially increased mortgage fraud risks for 
lenders (including the ultimate purchasers of mortgage loans) for 
two reasons. 
First, today’s lender (or loan buyer) typically has had no direct 
contact with the borrower and has no personal information 
about the borrower. Unlike loans made by Bailey Building & 
Loan, where George Bailey personally knew his customers, 
today’s lender only possesses a name, a social security number 
and a record prepared by third parties, such as credit reporting 
agencies and appraisers.
Second, today’s lender typically has no direct, personal 
knowledge about the collateral for the loan, i.e., the house. 
With loans made by Bailey Building & Loan, the principals 
and employees of the local lender knew their hometown, 
Bedford Falls, and all the neighborhoods in which its customers 
bought homes. 
The lack of fungibility of housing values is a key ingredient 
that allows many types of mortgage fraud to succeed. 
A lender’s risk with respect to collateral value is reduced if the 
collateral is one or more units of a standardized type of property, 
which has a value that is readily determined by reference to 
published market data. 
For example, a secured loan collateralized by assets such as 
gold (or other standardized commodities) or publicly traded 
securities presents no real problem in assessing the market value 
of the collateral at loan origination or on any other given date. 
Similarly, determining the value of a typical automobile 
for the purpose of making a car loan is not overly challenging, 
given published guides listing estimated dealer and retail prices 
based on standard variables such as mileage, accessories and 
general condition.
In contrast, it is much harder to determine the value of 
any particular dwelling unit, especially when the lender is at a 
distance. This is why tainted appraisals are readily accepted by 
originating lenders and by loan purchasers. 
Consider, for example, one single-family house, 
located in Atlanta, Ga., having four bedrooms and 
two baths. Unless we acquire more information, it 
is impossible to say what it may be worth. Location 
and many other variables will determine that house’s 
actual market value. 
Transactional Distance
Parties to the traditional mortgage loan once had 
“transactional proximity,” meaning the borrower and lender dealt 
with one another directly with respect to the loan application and 
most of the other requirements that had to be satisfied before the 
lender funded the loan. 
When necessary, the principals hired agents, but their roles 
were circumscribed and their presence did not have the effect 
of taking control of the transaction away from the principals or 
reducing direct contact between the principals with respect to the 
key elements of the contemplated loan transaction.
The secondary mortgage market began taking off during the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, while the roles of third parties in 
mortgage loan origination were also changing. Over time, these 
intermediaries assumed new or expanded roles in facilitating 
residential loans. 
Transactional distance between the borrower and the lender 
soon became the new norm. Today, most lenders and borrowers 
have little direct contact as intermediaries separate and isolate the 
principal parties. 
These intermediaries, who sometimes serve as agents for 
one or both of the parties and sometimes serve as non-agent 
middlemen, include mortgage brokers, appraisers, closing 
officers, title insurers, surveyors, credit reporting agencies and 
participants in the secondary mortgage market.
Mortgage brokers function to eliminate direct contact 
between lenders and buyers. Not only does the mortgage broker 
select the lender, or select a small list of prospective lenders for 
the borrower to consider, but the broker typically serves as the 
conduit for all communication between the borrower and lender 
until the closing of the loan.
Real estate appraisers perform the vital role of certifying as to 
the market value of the house, which serves as the collateral for 
the mortgage loan. 
“The lack of fungibility of housing 
values is a key ingredient that 
allows many types of mortgage 
fraud to succeed.”
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In relatively few cases, the borrower selects the appraiser. 
Usually the originating lender picks the appraiser, and today the 
appraiser is usually an intermediary rather than an “in house 
appraiser” (an employee of the lender). 
In principle, the appraiser’s duty to his principal (the lender) 
should protect the lender from overestimating the value of the 
collateral. 
To the extent that the appraiser must exercise judgment 
in reaching a professional opinion as to value, the appraiser 
should estimate a conservative value, to assist the lender in 
making sure that adequate collateral value will back the loan. 
Ironically, however, the proximity between appraiser and 
lender has generally failed to serve this purpose in modern 
transactions. 
Originating lenders make profits only if they originate 
loans. They must originate high volumes of loans to obtain 
significant profits.
During most of the past decade, lenders applied an 
increasing amount of pressure on appraisers “to hit or exceed a 
predetermined value.” Appraisers who failed to deliver sufficiently 
high appraisals often lost business, with lenders shifting their 
business to appraisers who would confirm the target values.
Closing practices have also evolved in the direction of 
transactional distance. Closings were often held at the savings and 
loan association or bank building, and even when closings were 
held elsewhere, such as at a title company, an employee of the 
lender often attended. 
This gave the lender direct control over the closing and the 
ability to approve all documentation and to deal with any last-
minute changes or complications before parting with control over 
the loan funds. 
Nowadays, the norm is for an intermediary to close the loan, 
acting pursuant to loan instructions issued by the lender. The 
intermediary is usually a title company employee, an attorney or 
an independent closing officer.
Most lenders have their loans closed by many different 
individuals and, as a consequence, the lender usually cannot 
acquire sufficient information to ascertain the quality of a 
particular individual who closes its loans.
The pervasive use of all of the intermediaries or middlemen 
who create transactional distance between borrowers and lenders 
substantially adds to lender risk. 
Not only are borrowers and lenders separated, but the lender 
relies substantially on the work product of persons with whom 
the lender generally has no significant prior and continuing 
long-term relationship, and the lender has no objective reason to 
believe the work is competent and meets professional standards 
for quality. 
The presence of many intermediaries in today’s transactions 
enables mortgage fraud because fraudsters are able to corrupt 
intermediaries in a sizeable number of transactions. Even when 
an intermediary is not induced to prepare a record that he knows 
to be false, a fraudster can exploit an intermediary – especially 
one whose level of competence is minimal – by providing the 
intermediary with false information, which the intermediary 
turns into a record that appears to be fine on its face. 
Financial Distance
Parties to the traditional mortgage loan once had “financial 
proximity,” meaning that the borrower and lender had significant 
financial interests in the mortgage loan transaction. Both had and 
kept “skin in the game.” Both had significant financial interests 
after loan funding, which persisted until repayment of the loan at 
maturity or by refinancing.
Lenders generally required the borrower to make a meaningful 
down payment; thus, the borrower had an equity stake from day 
one. The borrower’s equity gradually grew every month because 
loan payments were set at an amount high enough to amortize the 
loan principal.
By funding the loan, the originating lender acquired a 
substantial financial asset. Prior to the development of the 
secondary mortgage market, most originating lenders held the 
large majority of the loans they made in their own portfolios.
Today, there are still many residential borrowers who have 
substantial equity in their properties, but there are enormous 
numbers of borrowers who have no equity (or negative equity) in 
their homes. 
Lenders began offering mortgage products with extremely small 
down payment requirements – for example, conventional loans 
with a 3 percent down payment. 
More recently, 100 percent financing and mortgage loans that 
allowed the borrower to finance closing costs by adding them to 
the initial principal balance became common. 
In addition, many newer loan products depart from the norm 
of level amortization over the loan period. Interest-only loans, 
which result in no amortization, and negative amortization loans, 
in which payments during the first years of the loan were less than 
the accrued interest, became increasingly popular.
During the past two decades, many lenders and borrowers, as 
well as purchasers of mortgaged-backed securities, ignoring history, 
have acted as if appreciation in home values is guaranteed and 
always will have an upward slope to some degree. 
Beginning in 2008, the U.S. housing bubble burst, with 
substantial losses in housing values in virtually every community 
in the nation. In the aggregate, U.S. homeowners lost close to $8 
trillion of housing equity between the high-water mark for housing 
prices, at the end of 2006, and the end of the first quarter of 2009.
Many owners who in fact had made significant down payments 
when they bought homes found themselves with negative equity. 
Such loans are said to be “underwater.” As of March 2009, 26 
percent of homeowners with mortgage debt owed more than the 
current value of their homes.
The Problem of Securitization
From the lender’s perspective, a key change involves the identity 
of the real stakeholder and, perhaps more importantly, the manner 
in which the investment is held. 
Due to the securitization of loans through the secondary 
mortgage market, few originating lenders retain a stake in the 
loans they create. Instead, originators generate new capital 
through securitization, selling their loans in the secondary 
mortgage market. 
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A prime value of mortgage securitization is that from the 
investor’s perspective, risk is diluted. Rather than owning entire 
loans, an investor owns a beneficial interest in a pool containing 
many loans, usually thousands. This hedges risk: A default by any 
one borrower under any one loan has a small impact on the value 
of the investor’s interest.
However, this raises a tragedy of the commons problem. 
Although dilution of the percentage of beneficial ownership 
has the benefit of hedging risk, at the same time it inevitably 
reduces the incentive that an owning investor has with respect to 
monitoring the performance of any single loan and, if the loan 
becomes nonperforming, to intervening to 
attempt to rectify the situation. 
Furthermore, when there is a default 
in a mortgage in a pool, the investor relies 
solely upon the efforts of the loan servicing 
firm and the issuer of the security. These 
firms lack sufficient incentives to attempt 
to restructure nonperforming loans. 
Suggested Reforms
Mortgage fraud has flourished because 
the residential mortgage market has 
adopted institutions and practices that create distance between 
borrowers and lenders. 
To combat mortgage fraud, reforms should reduce that 
distance. When it is not feasible to reduce distance, reforms 
instead should seek to mitigate the risks associated with distance.
With respect to geographical distance, it is neither feasible nor 
prudent to eliminate or drastically curtail the secondary mortgage 
market, but other reform measures are possible. 
A prime ingredient of mortgage fraud involves deception 
of the lender as to the borrower’s true identity, accomplished 
through identity theft, straw buyers or other means.
Loan closing practices generally consist of no more than 
a notary public viewing a borrower’s driver’s license, typically 
coupled with the borrower’s social security number being 
displayed on a credit report and other loan-related documents. 
Better closing procedures for verifying borrower identity could 
include requiring the borrower’s birth certificate, an identity 
card in addition to a driver’s license, copies of utility bills at 
the borrower’s current or previous residence, and taking digital 
photographs of borrowers and other closing participants.
The market could attach a “premium” to loans made by 
community lenders to borrowers residing within their discrete 
geographical market. Such loans bear less of a risk of mortgage 
fraud and less risk generally.
 The “premium” could be reflected by the price paid for 
such loans in the secondary mortgage market. Such loans might 
also properly bear a reduced mortgage insurance fee or one 
commensurate with the reduced risk.
The proposal for attaching a “premium” to community-
bank loans made to local borrowers will also serve to reduce 
transactional distance because such loans will typically not be 
made through a mortgage broker. 
Another reform aimed at transactional distance is recasting the 
lender-appraiser relationship. Under present practice, the lender 
usually contracts with an independent appraiser or appraisal firm. 
Lenders should be held liable for the work product of lender-
hired independent appraisers to the same extent as if they were 
employees. 
This would extend liability to secondary market buyers 
of loans who incur loss due to overstated appraisals when the 
appraisal flaw is due to intentional misconduct or negligence. 
Such a measure would significantly increase the incentive of 
lenders to monitor appraiser behavior.
The third type of borrower-
lender distance, financial distance, 
represents the misalignment of 
incentives to perform between the 
borrower and originating lender. 
Reforms on both sides of the lending 
equation seem necessary. 
So far, some attention has been 
given to the borrower side, with 
underwriting criteria reformed to 
require some meaningful down 
payment for virtually all borrowers. 
Reforms are needed to give 
originating lenders a sufficient, immediate interest in how the 
loans they make perform after sale in the secondary mortgage 
market. 
The federal Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, enacted in 2010, requires the seller of mortgage-
backed securities to retain at least 5 percent of the credit risk. 
However, the 5 percent risk retention only applies to loans 
classified by the lender as high risk, making it easy for the lender 
to avoid the retention requirement.
More importantly, 5 percent is not nearly enough to 
incentivize a lender not to make and sell “bad loans.” Recourse 
liability should be much greater. If not “full recourse” (100 
percent) which is common in commercial lending, at least much 
more than 5 percent.
One potential weakness of a meaningful recourse rule is that 
recourse is only as good as the solvency of the guarantor. As the 
current financial crisis has demonstrated, many U.S. financial 
institutions lack the cash reserves and capitalization to weather a 
significant economic slump. 
Accordingly, to serve as a meaningful incentive to avoid 
originating weak loans, coupled with the imposition of recourse 
liability, there would need to be assets set aside to cover some 
percentage of the potential liability.
Conclusion
Mortgage fraud is relatively easy to perpetuate and likely will 
always be present to some extent. 
The mortgage lending process, however, can and should be 
reformed to decrease the occurrence of tainted mortgage loans.
“Mortgage fraud has flourished 
because the residential 
mortgage market has adopted 
institutions and practices 
that create distance between 
borrowers and lenders. ”
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